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THE RISE AND DECLINE OF AMERICAN 
RELIGIOUS FREEDOM. By Steven D. Smith.1 
Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. 2014. Pp. 223. 
$39.95 (cloth). 
Anna Su2 
INTRODUCTION 
Does the history of the Religion Clauses still matter? The 
answer appears to be increasingly irrelevant in the modern 
constitutional world. After all, questions such as “what if religion 
is not special?” and “why tolerate religion?” have recently gained 
remarkable traction in mainstream legal and philosophical 
scholarship.3 These questions and the attitudes underlying them 
suggest a contemporary openness towards discarding a special 
solicitude for religion that was largely borne out of history. In 
many debates today, both inside and outside the courts, religious 
liberty claims are now seen as pretexts for discrimination,4 not as 
 1. Warren Distinguished Professor of Law at the University of San Diego and Co-
Executive Director of the USD Institute for Law and Religion. 
 2. Assistant Professor of Law, University of Toronto Faculty of Law. S.J.D., 
Harvard Law School. Thanks to Adam Shinar, Chris Szabla and Mark Tushnet for their 
helpful comments. 
 3. BRIAN LEITER, WHY TOLERATE RELIGION? (2013); Micah Schwartzman, What 
If Religion Is Not Special?, 79 U. CHI. L. REV. 1351 (2012). See also CHRISTOPHER L. 
EISGRUBER & LAWRENCE G. SAGER, RELIGIOUS FREEDOM AND THE CONSTITUTION 
(2007); Frederick Mark Gedicks, An Unfirm Foundation: The Regrettable Indefensibility 
of Religious Exemptions, 20 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L.J. 555 (1998); Steven G. Gey, Why 
Is Religion Special?: Reconsidering the Accommodation of Religion under the Religion 
Clauses of the First Amendment, 52 U. PITT. L. REV. 75 (1990). 
 4. See, e.g., Elane Photography, LLC v. Willock, 309 P.3d 53 (N.M. 2013) (holding 
that refusal to photograph a same-sex couple is in violation of state antidiscrimination 
laws); N. Coast Women’s Care Med. Grp., Inc. v. San Diego Cnty. Superior Court, 189 
P.3d 959 (Cal. 2008) (medical facility’s refusal to provide fertility treatment to a lesbian 
couple on religious grounds is a violation of the Unruh Civil Rights Act). For academic 
treatment, see MARCI A. HAMILTON, GOD VS. THE GAVEL: RELIGION AND THE LAW 
(2005); Caroline Mala Corbin, Above the Law?: The Constitutionality of the Ministerial 
Exemption from Antidiscrimination Law, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 1965 (2007). 
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the hard-won product of a long struggle for liberation from the 
temporal reach of divine revelation.5 How did we get here? 
One reason for the unmooring of contemporary questions 
and answers involving the Religion Clauses from its historical 
roots is the seeming inability of its own history to supply any 
coherent or meaningful answer to currently vexing questions 
surrounding religious freedom. Indeed, even the history itself is 
contested. The Supreme Court did not help in clarifying matters 
either when it issued contradictory rulings one after another.6 
While many scholars have been content to live with this 
arrangement, with one scholar calling the Establishment Clause 
largely irrelevant,7 others continued the Herculean task of making 
sense of the doctrinal quagmire.8 Whereas twelve years ago, two 
prominent legal scholars could describe the question of whether 
publicly funded vouchers may be used at private, religious schools 
without violating the Establishment Clause as the most important 
church-state issue at the time,9 today, religious questions are at 
the heart of an even more divisive, if not explosive, question in 
American society: the fight over gay rights and marriage equality. 
In this context, the history of the Clauses does not appear to offer 
any surefire ammunition for either side. 
The present analysis takes at its point of departure the claims 
advanced by Professor Steven D. Smith, a law professor at the 
University of San Diego, and a prominent scholar of the Religion 
Clauses, in his new book The Rise and Decline of American 
Religious Freedom. Smith presents a revised narrative to the 
standard version of the story of American religious freedom. The 
principle of separation of church and state, he argues, was not an 
unprecedented American innovation, but an ideal that has 
ancient origins. Instead of being a distinctive product of the 
 5. See generally MARK LILLA, THE STILLBORN GOD: RELIGION, POLITICS, AND 
THE MODERN WEST (2007). 
 6. Religion Clause jurisprudence is famous for being an “incoherent mess.” See, e.g., 
Noah Feldman, From Liberty to Equality: The Transformation of the Establishment Clause, 
90 CAL. L. REV. 673 (2002).  
 7. Richard C. Schragger, The Relative Irrelevance of the Establishment Clause, 89 
TEX. L. REV. 583 (2011). This is not to say that these scholars were happy with it, but rather 
they worked on religion issues piecemeal without attempting to make sense of the whole. 
 8. See, e.g., MARC O. DEGIROLAMI, THE TRAGEDY OF RELIGIOUS FREEDOM 
(2013); KENT GREENAWALT, RELIGION AND THE CONSTITUTION (2 VOLS., 2006, 2008); 
Alan Brownstein, The Religion Clauses as Mutually Reinforcing Mandates: Why the 
Arguments for Rigorously Enforcing the Free Exercise Clause and Establishment Clause 
Are Stronger When Both Clauses Are Taken Seriously, 32 CARDOZO L. REV. 1701 (2011). 
 9. John C. Jeffries, Jr. & James E. Ryan, A Political History of the Establishment 
Clause, 100 MICH. L. REV. 279 (2001).  
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Enlightenment, Smith characterizes American religious freedom 
as a happy blending of explicitly Christian commitments with 
cosmopolitan pagan attitudes (p. 7), and that this convergence of 
ancient themes in an American package was unwittingly set aside 
by the Supreme Court when it inaugurated its modern Religion 
Clause jurisprudence in Everson v. Board of Education10 (p. 46). 
Stepping firmly into the thicket of religion-state relations, the 
Court infused a substantive core into the Religion Clauses which 
originally had none—the Framers enacted them simply to 
reaffirm the jurisdictional status quo (p. 8), that is, that matters 
involving religion would remain the business of the states, and not 
the federal government. The result of this move was to undo a 
golden age of American religious freedom, one which is best 
described as a period of fluid contestation, whereby competing 
interpretations of the role of religion in American public life had 
a rightful place at the constitutional table. According to Smith, 
separation during this period meant separation of church from 
state, not necessarily religion from government (p. 9). Thanks to 
the Supreme Court, however, this substantive core, now 
containing the principle of secular equality, has become hard 
constitutional law (p. 10), any deviations from which are 
considered to be official heresy. Consequently, American society 
is now more divided than ever. Far from being a mere lamentation 
on the state of Religion Clause jurisprudence, this historical 
excursion serves as the backdrop to Smith’s ultimate concern that 
American religious freedom is in jeopardy, not from religious 
conservatives but from secular egalitarians (p. 11). 
These are radical claims. And yet both the premise and the 
implications of Smith’s revised narrative have much to offer to 
current debates involving competing claims to religious liberty 
and antidiscrimination. Perhaps the account could be seen as a 
clarion call on the hurtling train of the new secular orthodoxy 
threatening to unravel the lively experiment of the past two 
hundred years. Of course, secular egalitarians would argue that 
the opposite is true. But even in that vein, this account could also 
be considered a confirmation of their beliefs, that their victories 
are merely recent and most of all fragile against the tyrannical 
forces of revealed religion. 
In this review, I first briefly consider the uses of history in 
Religion Clause jurisprudence and question the need for deep 
origins in excavating the origins of the American principles of 
 10. 330 U.S. 1 (1947).  
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separation of church and state and freedom of conscience. A 
mistaken resort to deep origins detracts from the political and 
material conditions which shaped the ideas involving religious 
freedom at the time of its drafting into the Constitution and 
diminishes the role of human agency. Subsequently, I evaluate 
Smith’s argument that the Supreme Court ended the golden age 
of American religious freedom when it put a thumb onto the scale 
and transformed religious freedom questions and answers into 
hard constitutional law. I argue that these decisions, though 
frustrating and incoherent as they might seem, in fact, are as 
responsible for the remarkable religious pluralism that exists in 
American society today as much as for the contemporary secular 
extremism that Smith deplores. In the last part of this essay, I pose 
a brief account of history and judicial review as two technologies 
of constraint. 
These challenges are not intended to undermine the book’s 
goal but rather to support it. If the objective is to keep the 
American pluralist experiment involving the place of religion in 
public life from prematurely ending, the solution is not to go back 
deep into an ancient, remote past or worse, discard history 
altogether, but it is to let “We the People” grapple with these 
difficult questions in political and legal circles, armed with a sense 
of their own past, and an eye cast towards a future that is yet to 
be written. By their very nature, these questions are open-ended. 
Within a constitutional tradition such as ours, the task for the 
courts is to keep that experiment alive. 
I. THE PROBLEM OF DEEP ORIGINS 
The distinctiveness of religion as a matter of U.S. 
constitutional law is seemingly reflected in the two prongs of the 
Religion Clauses: that of disestablishment and free exercise. At 
its core, these twin guarantees protect the right of Americans to 
freely practice their religion. But there universal agreement 
begins and ends. Since 1947, this unique formulation to protect 
the liberty of conscience has generated a massive amount of 
academic literature to explain why the Framers thought it was 
essential not only to guarantee free exercise but also to mandate 
disestablishment, and how those ideas could be made applicable 
within the context of our own time. 
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Not unlike those of other constitutional provisions,11 the 
historical origins of the Religion Clauses not only provide a 
fascinating view into the eighteenth century world of the 
Founding generation but they also give the Supreme Court an 
authoritative ground for its decisions. Indeed, the first prong of 
the standard model of constitutional interpretation is history, 
which is to say, the reliance on the original intentions of the 
ratifiers or the framers of the Constitution.12 As one commentator 
remarked, “[t]he past may be only prologue, but for the Supreme 
Court that prologue sometimes appears to direct the whole 
drama.”13 Even if one does not wholly subscribe to the originalist 
school of constitutional interpretation, the subject of which is 
beyond the scope of this Review, judicial divination of the original 
intent behind the Religion Clauses generates much normative 
work in existing cases.14 Consider Justice Hugo Black’s majority 
opinion in Everson,15 a landmark case in Religion Clause 
jurisprudence which incorporated the Establishment Clause to 
apply as against the states, in addition to the federal government. 
Justice Black gave short shrift to the complex story of how the 
principle of religious liberty found roots in and thrived on 
American soil. Instead, he advanced what Noah Feldman called a 
“‘shock’ hypothesis” of religious liberty,16 in which centuries of 
persecution before and contemporaneous with the Founding 
period largely provided the backdrop for the adoption of the 
Establishment Clause, in order to come up with the rationale that 
separation of church of state was intended by the Framers to 
protect religious minorities. 
It is hardly controversial in legal academic circles to state that 
Everson was a modern invention of the Establishment Clause by 
the Court. Among the most well-known of these challenges is 
Philip Hamburger’s massive tome, Separation of Church and 
 11. The most recent example is the Second Amendment. See, e.g., Saul Cornell, 
Originalism on Trial: The Use and Abuse of History in District of Columbia v. Heller, 69 
OHIO ST. L. J. 625 (2008). 
 12. PHILIP BOBBITT, CONSTITUTIONAL FATE: THEORY OF THE CONSTITUTION 
(1982). 
 13. John G. Wofford, The Blinding Light: The Uses of History in Constitutional 
Interpretation, 31 U. CHI. L. REV. 502, 502 (1964). 
 14. “No provision of the Constitution is more closely tied to or given content by its 
generating history than the religious clause of the First Amendment. It is at once the 
refined product and the terse summation of that history.” Everson, 330 U.S. at 333 
(Rutledge, J., dissenting). 
 15. Id at 3–18. The Free Exercise Clause was incorporated much earlier in Cantwell 
v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940).  
 16. Feldman, supra note 6, at 682.  
 
ANNA SU SMITH RELIGIOUS FREEDOM_DRAFT 1 (DO NOT DELETE) 12/29/2014 3:10 PM 
132 CONSTITUTIONAL COMMENTARY [Vol. 30:127 
State. In that book, Hamburger excoriated the Court’s historical 
reappropriation as erroneously reading a separationist 
understanding into the First Amendment which had none, and 
attributed it to nativist, anti-Catholic sentiment, held by no less 
than Justice Black himself.17 Similarly, Smith’s Rise and Decline 
also takes Everson to task. But he does so for an entirely different 
reason. Smith argues that Everson failed to acknowledge the 
ancient roots of the American principles of separation of church 
and state and freedom of conscience (p. 46). 
In Smith’s retelling, Everson occupies a marginal, if not 
distracting, role (p. 114), and instead credits the school prayer 
decisions of the 1960s, particularly Engel v. Vitale and Abington 
School District v. Schempp as profoundly more significant in 
shaping modern Establishment Clause jurisprudence.18 Everson, 
he argues, was a misleading starting point. But it is nonetheless 
important because it mistakenly appropriated the backdrop of the 
Enlightenment revolt against the dark side of Christendom, 
though only partially true, as part of the American constitutional 
narrative. At this point, Smith begins his revised narrative of 
probing the origins of American religious freedom in deep 
antiquity, starting with the conduciveness for inclusive tolerance 
and freedom of Roman paganism (p. 17). From the fourth century 
when Constantine adopted Christianity as the official religion of 
the Roman Empire, to the papal crisis of the medieval period, 
onward to Henry VIII’s break with Rome and the consequent 
creation of the Church of England, up to the American Founding 
period, he surveys more than two thousand years of Western 
political development in order to recover the deep origins of the 
much cherished American principles of separation of church and 
state as well as freedom of conscience. 
Rise and Decline is not a work of historical scholarship and at 
different moments in the book Smith acknowledges that. It 
belongs to a genre called history-in-law,19 which is a genre of legal 
 17. PHILIP HAMBURGER, SEPARATION OF CHURCH AND STATE (2002). Specifically, 
Hamburger accused Justice Black, formerly a member of the Ku Klux Klan, of harboring 
these anti-Catholic tendencies which formed the background of Everson’s separationist 
thrust.  
 18. Abington Sch. Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963) (Bible reading in public 
schools is unconstitutional); Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962) (holding that government-
directed prayer in public schools is unconstitutional even if the prayer is neutral and 
students may remain silent or be excused from the room). 
 19. Mark Tushnet, Interdisciplinary Legal Scholarship: The Case of History-in-Law, 
71 CHI. KENT L. REV. 909 (1996) (defending history-in-law as a legal, not historical 
practice).  
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scholarship that creates a useable past in order to support or 
generate a legal argument. In its more derogatory form, history-
in-law is also known by the term law-office history, a perennial 
topic of debate between lawyers and historians.20 Both sides of this 
debate have been exhaustively mined for quite some time, and 
this is not the moment to rehash those arguments. As a matter of 
legal, rather than historical practice, then, history-in-law is 
therefore not subject to the same criteria for evaluation as 
ordinary history. Ordinary history emphasizes the pastness of the 
past; history-in-law mines it to support a contemporary position. 
That said, however, basic rules of historical practice would 
presumably still apply. Smith’s reach into deep antiquity does not 
provide a solid ground for his argument that libertas ecclesiae or 
freedom of the church is a major animating principle behind 
separation of church and state as well as the modern-day 
conception of liberty of conscience. Indeed, opponents of this 
position, labeled as religious institutionalism,21 attack this move as 
anachronistic and selective.22 The seemingly nostalgic 
resuscitation of the bygone era of cosmopolitan paganism under 
Roman rule, and the dramatic medieval showdown between 
Henry IV of Germany and Pope Gregory VII which featured 
Henry’s famous Walk to Canossa (pp. 32-33) focuses on 
questionable episodes from which to plumb for historical 
imprimatur, and readily invites criticisms of the sort that legal 
scholars Micah Schwartzman and Richard Schragger make in 
their article. 
The resort to deep origins is not unique to American legal 
scholarship on the Religion Clauses. Until very recently, the 
general historiography of human rights has always emphasized its 
deep roots, whether as early as the Mesopotamian Codes of 
Hammurabi or from the natural rights claims of the seventeenth 
century.23 The revisionist pushback to these accounts revolves 
mainly around their teleological inclination, that is, the seductive 
tendency to find a kind of conceptual coherence across historical 
periods without proper accounting for its immediate political, 
 20. See, e.g., Cornell, supra note 11. The earliest criticism is in Alfred H. Kelly, Clio 
and the Court: An Illicit Love Affair, 1965 SUP. CT. REV. 119 (1965).  
 21. The most sustained opposition is in Richard Schragger & Micah Schwartzman, 
Against Religious Institutionalism, 99 VA. L. REV. 917 (2013) (historical anachronism is 
only one among several criticisms of this position). 
 22. Id. at 928. 
 23. See, e.g., MICHELINE R. ISHAY, THE HISTORY OF HUMAN RIGHTS: FROM 
ANCIENT TIMES TO THE GLOBALIZATION ERA (2d ed. 2008).  
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intellectual, and cultural milieu.24 The eminent historian Eric 
Foner called this “the plumb line” problem, in which a political 
theory or idea is given a fixed definition and is then traced how it 
has been worked out over time.25 One problematic result of this 
approach is that it naturalizes present arrangements, and ignores 
human agency in the process of working out abstract ideas in 
concrete and rather messy historical realities. By invoking deep 
history, however, Rise and Decline does the opposite—it 
generates and naturalizes a normative ideal, not necessarily the 
present arrangement. But as Schwartzman and Schragger 
rightfully, if briefly, note, Pope Gregory VII’s cry of libertas 
ecclesiae was part of a broader, long-running political struggle that 
was not a solely an instance of the church attempting to wrest its 
independence from an overbearing secular authority.26 As one 
scholar put it, even the great confrontation between Henry II and 
the martyred Archbishop Thomas Becket, the same episode 
which does a lot of work in Smith’s account (p. 33), was more an 
“accidental creation of personality and circumstance rather than 
of any great inevitable clash of principle.”27 In addition, the idea 
of dualism, that is, that Christ himself instituted dual jurisdictions 
between earthly and spiritual authorities, was far from a self-
evident notion even at that time. Medieval popes acknowledged 
it with the caveat that the spiritual realm was of more importance 
than the earthly one. Kings and emperors, unsurprisingly, did not 
subscribe to this hierocratic view. Accordingly, canonists, 
theologians and civil law scholars from both camps engaged in 
dueling interpretations. 
Notwithstanding this analytical flaw, one finds much in 
Western history on which to base Smith’s assertions that 
separation of church and state and liberty of conscience were not 
just American inventions. And one need not go that far back into 
it. That the very idea of religious freedom has had religious, rather 
than secular, origins, finds ample evidence in not-so-deep history, 
and in academic scholarship. The leading figures of the Protestant 
Reformation, such as John Calvin, Philipp Melanchthon, and 
Martin Luther himself, all wrote on the liberty of conscience from 
a definitively theological and certainly Christian standpoint. 
 24. The most influential is SAMUEL MOYN, THE LAST UTOPIA: HUMAN RIGHTS IN 
HISTORY (2010). 
 25. ERIC FONER, THE STORY OF AMERICAN FREEDOM xiv (1999). 
 26. Schragger & Schwartzman, supra note 21, at 935. 
 27. J.A. Watt, Spiritual and Temporal Powers, in THE CAMBRIDGE HISTORY OF 
MEDIEVAL POLITICAL THOUGHT C. 350- C.1450, 391 (J.H. Burns ed., 1988).  
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Political theorist Eric Nelson, for instance, has recently argued 
that theological debates in Europe around the notion of a Hebrew 
Republic influenced the development of ideas surrounding 
religious tolerance amongst British Protestants during the early 
modern period.28 Jeremy Waldron has also argued that John 
Locke, that quintessential Enlightenment thinker and progenitor 
of so many American constitutional ideas, was very much 
influenced by Christian theism in his political writings, including 
his ideas on religious toleration.29 
It is difficult, therefore, to justify the resort to deep origins if 
the Western European religious and political milieu from which 
American constitutional thought, especially on the relationship 
between religion and government, arose offered similar resources 
and arguments. Consider John Locke, an immediate and major 
influence in the thinking of the two giants of American religious 
freedom: Thomas Jefferson and James Madison. Locke’s A Letter 
Concerning Toleration and Two Treatises of Government already 
expounded on the idea of separate spheres of religious and civil 
authority. Unlike the medieval decretists, however, he did not 
think one was more important than the other. Instead, his 
distinguishing principle was whether one was necessary for 
salvation or not,30 an explicitly religious rationale. Rise and 
Decline does recognize that the Enlightenment, mainly through 
Locke but also in a different way, David Hume, served as a 
conduit for Christian ideas, rather than a complete break from it, 
in order to counter the mainstream narrative that the 
Enlightenment was a triumphant revolt of reason against religion. 
Thomas Hobbes, Jean Jacques Rousseau, and Baruch Spinoza are 
the towering philosophical figures associated with this particular 
strain of Enlightenment thinking. But Locke in particular 
developed his theory on separate spheres of authority or 
jurisdictions based on Christian rationales, while Jefferson 
stressed the importance of the voluntariness of faith, though he 
 28. ERIC NELSON, THE HEBREW REPUBLIC: JEWISH SOURCES AND THE 
TRANSFORMATION OF EUROPEAN POLITICAL THOUGHT (2010). Of course, the 
competing, if more mainstream, narrative, that religious freedom has had rationalistic 
Enlightenment origins, is also present. Historian Mark Lilla deftly surveys the great 
philosophers and thinkers of the same period in his book. LILLA, supra note 5. 
 29. JEREMY WALDRON, GOD, LOCKE AND EQUALITY: CHRISTIAN FOUNDATIONS 
OF LOCKE’S POLITICAL THOUGHT (2002). 
 30. JOHN LOCKE, THE SECOND TREATISE OF GOVERNMENT AND A LETTER 
CONCERNING TOLERATION (Dover 2002) (1689). For an excellent discussion of how his 
ideas were brought to the United States, see Noah Feldman, The Intellectual Origins of the 
Establishment Clause, 77 N.Y.U L. REV. 346, 354–98 (2002).  
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referenced a nonsectarian deity.31 They were also the ones most 
directly associated in developing American constitutional 
thought. But what the book appears to do is to use Locke, 
Madison, and Jefferson as mere seventeenth century mediums for 
the more ancient ideas of dual jurisdictions and liberty of 
conscience (pp. 39–40). That channeling flies in the face of almost 
five hundred years of discrete political and intellectual struggles 
within various contexts—institutional, cultural, political—in 
Europe from the end of the Middle Ages up until the American 
revolutionary period. 
No contemporary idea appears ex nihilo, that much is true. 
But it is also true that no idea or principle stays the same as it 
travels throughout human history, influenced and developed as it 
were by varying political claims, unintended consequences, and 
shifting moralities. Even for history-in-law, the past, especially the 
deep past, is still very much a foreign country. 
II. THE PROBLEM OF TWO CONSTITUTIONALISMS 
Rise and Decline also addresses the distinction between two 
kinds of constitutions: the hard Constitution, that is, the formal 
legal document that Article III judges interpret and enforce, and 
the soft constitution, the “more amorphous but not necessarily 
less important body of constitutive understandings, practices, and 
commitments” (p. 96), and laments how the shift towards the 
former to the detriment of the latter ended the golden age of 
American religious pluralism. 
This claim has three major components: first, there was 
indeed a golden age of American religious freedom, one where 
competing interpretations of questions involving religion had a 
rightful place as a constitutional matter; second, there was a 
definitive shift from the soft constitution to the hard constitution; 
last and most important, the move to the hard constitution 
undermined the erstwhile distinctive American strategy of 
dealing with religious diversity (p. 113). Let us address each of 
these claims briefly. 
 31. The younger John Locke shared similar views with Thomas Hobbes on an 
Erastian arrangement, wherein religion is subservient to the state for the sake of civil peace 
and order. He modified his views later on in Two Treatises.  
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A. GOLDEN AGE OF AMERICAN RELIGIOUS FREEDOM  
Smith argues that Americans have largely subscribed to two 
contrasting interpretations of the Republic, and that these two 
interpretations, secularist and providentialist, coexisted, 
“sometimes cordially and sometimes combatively” (p. 87) from 
the Founding to the present day. That secularist and evangelical 
impulses together characterized much of American history is not 
in question. Americans for the most part agreed that religious 
freedom was important and central to the national identity though 
interpretations of what that ideal actually meant remained 
constantly up for grabs. 
The period that Rise and Decline extols as a golden age also 
happens to coincide with two of the Great Awakenings in U.S. 
religious history, a period of Protestant revivalism which elevated 
moral vocabulary and fused evangelicalism with the moral 
reasoning of the prevailing republican tradition. From the more 
secular elites to the evangelical masses, everybody believed that 
religion was important in cultivating civic virtue, the debate 
mostly surrounded the question of how. These periods, roughly 
from the end of the eighteenth century to the beginning of the 
twentieth, saw the emergence and flourishing of a number of 
Protestant sects and movements. These movements emphasized 
the application of Christian teachings to social problems, from 
self-improvement to social reform.32 But this was also the time 
when intense religious persecution ran rampant in U.S. history. 
Widespread anti-Catholic sentiment, a longtime American 
prejudice inherited from Europe, exploded as a reaction to the 
influx of Irish immigration in the mid-nineteenth century, the 
school wars of the nineteenth century just one episode in this long-
running saga.33 During the Gilded Age, Jews, buoyed by their 
great and rapid financial success, also became the target of 
populist attacks, though none compared to intensity of the anti-
Catholic campaign.34 These persecutions were mostly rooted on 
nativist reactions to the social consequences of massive 
immigration, but even a homegrown religion such as Mormonism 
fell to pervasive bigotry which saw its followers flee from a small 
 32. See generally MARK A. NOLL, AMERICA’S GOD: FROM JONATHAN EDWARDS 
TO ABRAHAM LINCOLN (2005) (for the Second Great Awakening); ROBERT T. HANDY, 
A CHRISTIAN AMERICA: PROTESTANT HOPES AND HISTORICAL REALITIES (1984). 
 33. See generally JOHN HIGHAM, STRANGERS IN THE LAND: PATTERNS OF 
AMERICAN NATIVISM 1860-1925 (1955); On Catholics in particular, see JOHN 
MCGREEVY, CATHOLICISM AND AMERICAN FREEDOM: A HISTORY (2003).  
 34. MCGREEVY, supra note 33.  
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town in Illinois to the Territory of Utah. In 1890, as a reaction to 
Congress escheating all of its assets in favor of the federal 
government, the Mormon Church finally capitulated and 
disavowed its controversial practice of plural marriage.35 These 
examples hardly scratch the not-so-desirable surface of the 
American religious landscape of the period. Indeed, the 
conspicuous absence of the travails of Native Americans involving 
the practice of their traditional religion in mainstream legal 
scholarship on religious freedom is glaring evidence. 
Rise and Decline does not mention any of these episodes, 
even as it acknowledged that “[r]eligious minorities sometimes 
suffered estrangement, persecution, even violence” (p. 109). The 
book appears to almost romanticize the period, and then 
conceding in effect that one who is already inclined not to find 
anything positive in this period would not find it satisfactory. But 
this is not simply an inability to find the silver lining but simply to 
acknowledge that if there was indeed a golden age, it was simply 
a golden age for some, and not for most. The majority of 
Americans of the period found themselves in a milieu 
undergirded by a Protestant Christian worldview, even given the 
theological differences among them, and that provided them a 
common language to express their commitments. That the level 
and nature of the persecution within the United States was of a 
milder nature than those in Europe during the same period should 
hardly be praiseworthy. Using a more modern example, Smith 
also mentions the relatively peaceful period of the 1950s under 
the Eisenhower presidency, the calm which would be undone by 
the school prayer decisions. There is ample historical evidence 
that suggests, however, that this momentary religious unity—
captured by Will Herberg’s classic Protestant-Catholic-Jew36—was 
largely a manufactured effort by the government as part of a 
cultural offensive in the early Cold War years.37 This is not to say 
that American religiosity came out of the blue, far from it, but 
that, at this time, there was an orchestrated, top-down, attempt to 
present a united domestic front in combating the spread of 
Communist ideology. As the initial sense of urgency waned, the 
leaders of this movement, from President Eisenhower to the 
 35. SARAH BARRINGER GORDON, THE MORMON QUESTION: POLYGAMY AND 
CONSTITUTIONAL CONFLICT IN NINETEENTH-CENTURY AMERICA 219–20 (2002). 
 36. WILL HERBERG, PROTESTANT, CATHOLIC, JEW: AN ESSAY IN AMERICAN 
RELIGIOUS SOCIOLOGY (1983). 
 37. JONATHAN P. HERZOG, THE SPIRITUAL-INDUSTRIAL COMPLEX: AMERICA’S 
RELIGIOUS BATTLE AGAINST COMMUNISM IN THE EARLY COLD WAR (2011).  
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Supreme Court in Engel, halted the march of the “sacralization” 
of American life. And even if one’s focus is on the political order, 
as Smith argues, not the suffering of individual dissenters, the 
American settlement which seemed to manage to hold the nation 
together regardless of religious differences is as true today with 
the courts in the picture as it was back then when they were not, 
or at least not as much. Perhaps courts are even more important 
now than before because of the incomparable magnitude of 
religious diversity which currently exists.38 
B. FROM SOFT CONSTITUTIONALISM TO HARD AND BACK 
A crucial point that Rise and Decline makes is that what made 
such a golden age possible was soft constitutionalism. The notion 
of a small-c constitution, “that assemblage of laws, institutions 
and customs, derived from certain fixed principles of reason, 
directed to certain fixed objects of public good, that compose the 
general system that community had agreed to be governed,”39 
predates the founding of the United States. Prior to the 
incorporation of the Religion Clauses, Smith celebrates the genius 
of the American settlement of questions involving religion which 
consisted of various courts reaching contrary conclusions. 
Because these were primarily decided as matters of state law, no 
group could claim that their interpretation was the definitive 
constitutional interpretation, in the big-C, contemporary sense of 
the term. Even Supreme Court decisions at that time, such as Holy 
Trinity Church v. United States, which infamously declared that 
“this is a Christian nation,”40 Smith argues, were intended to 
reflect fluid social facts, not constitutional ones. As popular views 
evolve, whether on the secularist or providentialist side, the 
political process could reflect and give effect to those changes by 
virtue of legislation. Under this view, states would truly be the 
local laboratories envisioned by the federal setup. Most 
importantly, it avoids the polarizing effect that today’s Supreme 
Court decisions seem to create and foster as one side or the other 
is left with the feeling of alienation from the national 
constitutional project. 
 38. ROBERT D. PUTNAM & DAVID E. CAMPBELL, AMERICAN GRACE: HOW 
RELIGION DIVIDES AND UNITES US (2010). 
 39. HENRY ST. JOHN, VISCOUNT BOLINGBROKE, Dissertation on Parties, in 
BOLINGBROKE: POLITICAL WRITINGS 88 (David Armitage, ed. 1997). 
 40. 143 U.S. 457, 471 (1892). This is, however, a case involving statutory 
interpretation, not the Religion Clauses.  
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There are two problems with this claim. First, the premise 
that the Establishment Clause was enacted to be a jurisdictional 
bar only against the federal government and nothing more is still 
a matter of ongoing debate. It is true that the clearest we could 
infer from the historical record is that there was to be no national 
church similar to the Church of England. But there the consensus 
ends, and what to make of the substantive content of the 
Establishment Clause is still a hotly contested topic among 
scholars.41 Moreover, a full-blown federalist view of the 
Establishment Clause detracts from a conception of the Bill of 
Rights as a guarantee of individual rights, instead of, or in 
addition to, a limitation on federal government action. Lastly, as 
a practical matter, this position finds no support from the current 
members of the Supreme Court, except for Justice Clarence 
Thomas. 
More significantly, Rise and Decline faults the Supreme 
Court’s elevation of principles such as secularism or neutrality as 
hard constitutional law,42 thus losing what was initially its 
beneficially agnostic posture. Because this is how the Supreme 
Court has interpreted what the big-C Constitution definitively 
means, competing providentialist claims are now understood to 
be and relegated to the status of “constitutional heresy” (p. 123). 
The lamentable result of this development, first begun by the 
Court in its school prayer decisions Engel and Schempp—Smith’s 
long-running bêtes noires43—was to prop up an illusion of secular 
neutrality, still prevailing up to this day, which in reality, is a 
conceptual impossibility given that the baseline for measuring 
such is not available.44 In a nutshell, what might be a neutral 
baseline for some is not neutral for others. 
 41. See, e.g., Akhil Reed Amar, The Bill of Rights as a Constitution, 100 YALE L.J. 
1131 (1991) (for a federalist reading of the entire Bill of Rights); but cf. Frederick Mark 
Gedicks, Incorporation of the Establishment Clause Against the States: A Logical, Textual, 
and Historical Account, 88 IND. L. J. 669 (2013) (arguing that Establishment Clause not 
only immunized states but also individuals against the consequences of establishing a 
national church). For a discussion on why history cannot definitively support the federalist 
position, see Feldman, supra note 30, at 405–12. 
 42. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971) (adopting the three-prong Lemon test 
one of which posits that the legislation involved must have a secular purpose); Abington 
Sch. Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963) (declaring Bible reading in public schools to be 
unconstitutional for violating government neutrality on religion); Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 
421 (1962) (declaring that government must be neutral with regard to religion).  
 43. Steven D. Smith, Constitutional Divide: The Transformative Significance of the 
School Prayer Decisions, 38 PEPP. L. REV. 945 (2010).  
 44. For a fuller account of this point, see STEVEN D. SMITH, THE DISENCHANTMENT 
OF SECULAR DISCOURSE (2010).  
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At several instances, Rise and Decline sounds like a call to 
“take the Constitution away from the courts,”45 that is, to bring 
the insights of popular constitutionalism, the contemporary 
intellectual movement in American constitutional scholarship 
which seeks to broaden the community of authoritative 
constitutional interpreters, to include other branches of 
government, the states and the people at large, to Religion 
Clauses jurisprudence. Defending the prevailing somewhat messy 
and incoherent jurisprudence in this area is an unenviable 
Herculean task, and one which is not fit for a review essay. But 
even conceding the rather unprincipled way the Court has went 
about in resolving cases involving religion, and the indeterminate 
nature of the principle of neutrality currently in use,46 the 
Supreme Court, and by extension, hard constitutional law, is far 
from being the enemy. 
The big-C Constitution is more than just a written document; 
it also comprises of a set of practices and understandings which 
serves as its interpretive context.47 Thus, a constitution serves as 
legal framework for an ongoing debate and dialogue in which all 
members of a society could participate.48 Courts can therefore 
facilitate, rather than just hinder, popular deliberation about 
constitutional issues. Here, perhaps, the gulf between soft 
constitutionalism and hard constitutionalism is not as wide as 
Smith sees it to be. The world we presently inhabit features both 
hard and soft constitutionalism; this is what historian and legal 
scholar Sarah Barringer Gordon calls “the new constitutional 
world.”49 While the Supreme Court makes definitive rulings, 
popular mobilizations around these decisions and the meanings 
they give to them overlap. They create unlikely alliances in favor 
of, and against such decisions. For instance, in the aftermath of 
the Goodridge decision in Massachusetts legalizing same-sex 
 45. MARK TUSHNET, TAKING THE CONSTITUTION AWAY FROM THE COURTS 
(1999); see also LARRY D. KRAMER, THE PEOPLE THEMSELVES: POPULAR 
CONSTITUTIONALISM AND JUDICIAL REVIEW (2004).  
 46. But see ANDREW KOPPELMAN, DEFENDING AMERICAN RELIGIOUS 
NEUTRALITY (2013) (arguing that neutrality is a coherent and attractive principle which 
promotes the goals of a secular state through the use of deliberate and careful vagueness). 
 47. AKHIL REED AMAR, AMERICA’S UNWRITTEN CONSTITUTION: THE 
PRECEDENTS AND PRINCIPLES WE LIVE BY (2012). 
 48. Adam Shinar, The End of Constitutional Law?, 29 CONST. COMMENT. 181, 207 
(2014) (reviewing Louis M. Seidman’s On Constitutional Disobedience, and arguing for the 
discursive benefits of having a constitution). 
 49. SARAH BARRINGER GORDON, THE SPIRIT OF THE LAW: RELIGIOUS VOICES 
AND THE CONSTITUTION IN MODERN AMERICA (2010). Similar to Smith, she 
characterizes the pre-Everson era as the “old constitutional world.” Id. at 213.  
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marriages, an unlikely alliance, erstwhile unheard of, between the 
Archdiocese of Boston of the Roman Catholic Church and the 
conservative Protestant group Focus on the Family, joined forces 
in a campaign for a state constitutional amendment to overturn 
the decision. On the opposing side, liberal religious groups 
banded together with secular feminists.50 In the same way that 
Brown v. Board of Education became a rallying point for the civil 
rights movement, the same case could be made for those who are 
as concerned with the promotion of gender and marriage equality 
as much as the protection of religious liberty of believing 
Americans. 
It is true that losers have no reason to abide by settlements 
that they deeply oppose. And here, Smith sees these definitive 
constitutional pronouncements as only creating a section of the 
American populace, mostly religious Americans, presumably 
seeing themselves as perennial losers, and thus intensifying the 
culture wars that he deplores. Indeed no other pair of decisions 
by the Supreme Court produced more hate mail against the Court 
than Engel and Schempp.51 But these decisions are an invitation 
to mobilize and forge alliances, and not, contrary to Smith’s claim, 
to stop any conversation. The remarkable political alliances and 
reconfigurations which occurred in the wake of Everson and 
Engel and Schempp, perhaps most vividly captured in the political 
transformation of the originally anti-Catholic group, Protestants 
and other Americans United for the Separation of Church and 
State (POAU), into the more liberal, nonsectarian Americans 
United for the Separation of Church and State (AU), are a 
testament to this fluid social landscape that both shapes and is 
shaped by these Supreme Court decisions. Groups, even religious 
ones, are never monolithic entities. 
Having raised Brown as an analogy, it is impossible not to 
mention the alternative view of what Brown was actually 
responsible for. Under legal historian and constitutional scholar 
Michael Klarman’s backlash thesis,52 Brown crystallized southern 
resistance to desegregation and, at least, temporarily, destroyed 
any form of southern moderation on racial issues, while pushing 
 50. Id. at 204–07. 
 51. Id. at 86 (“However predictable the holdings may seem decades later, they fell 
like a meteor into American society.”). 
 52. Michael J. Klarman, How Brown Changed Race Relations: The Backlash Thesis, 
81 J. AM. HIST. 81 (1994). A fuller account is in MICHAEL KLARMAN, FROM JIM CROW TO 
CIVIL RIGHTS: THE SUPREME COURT AND THE STRUGGLE FOR RACIAL EQUALITY 
(2004).  
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to the forefront extremist positions. Rise and Decline appears to 
entertain a similar concern that Supreme Court decisions in the 
past and in the future, especially with the onslaught of litigation 
in all levels from district courts all the way up to the Supreme 
Court, often involving a zero-sum face-off between the values of 
non-discrimination and religious liberty, would bring out the 
extremist positions on both sides, and only one out of these two 
equally important and cherished American values would end up 
alive. That is not such a far-fetched scenario. Consider the slew of 
state religious freedom bills which have since been proposed as a 
reaction to recent federal court and state supreme court decisions 
striking down same-sex marriage bans. Religious conservatives 
feel they are under a secularist attack while supporters of gender 
and marriage equality express their disdain for religious beliefs 
they thought are being unfairly imposed upon them. For instance, 
although it has since been vetoed by Governor Jan Brewer, the 
controversy generated by Arizona State Senate Bill 1062 is an 
illustrative example. On its face, the proposal simply amends the 
existing state Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA) to 
clarify that “exercise of religion” means the “practice or 
observance of religion, including the ability to act or refusal to act 
in a manner substantially motivated by a religious belief, whether 
or not the exercise is compulsory or central to a larger system of 
religious belief.”53 It also expands the definition of “a person” to 
include not only religious institutions but also groups, including 
corporations. But because of the highly-charged atmosphere 
surrounding the issue, opponents unsurprisingly have gone at 
each other with increasing levels of vitriol, reading into the text, 
half-real, half-imagined, monsters ranging from religious bigotry 
to secular extremism to destroy.54 
III. “THE FAULT IN OUR STARS”: PRESERVING THE 
AMERICAN EXPERIMENT 
In the latest church-state case to date, Hosanna-Tabor 
Evangelical v. EEOC,55 a unanimous Supreme Court once again 
invoked the authority of history in upholding the constitutionality 
of the ministerial exception from Title VII nondiscrimination 
 53. S.B. 1062, 51st Leg., 2d Sess. (Ariz. 2014).  
 54. Sarah Posner, Is Supreme Court Jurisprudence Making State Religious Freedom 
Bills More Dangerous?, RELIGION DISPATCHES (Mar. 11, 2014), http://www.
religiondispatches.org/dispatches/sarahposner/7680/is_supreme_court_jurisprudence_ma
king_state_religious_freedom_bills_more_dangerous/. 
 55. 132 S. Ct. 694 (2012) (upholding constitutionality of the ministerial exception).  
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regulations. The question presented in that case was whether a 
Lutheran church could be sued for violation of employment 
discrimination laws when it fired an employee (who was put on 
leave for narcolepsy treatment but insisted on reporting for duty) 
for insubordination and disruptive behavior. The Court viewed 
the Religion Clauses to mean not only that the federal 
government cannot establish a national church but that it is also 
prevented from having any “role in filling ecclesiastical offices.”56 
The church, it turns out, is exempt from such suits. Writing for the 
majority, Chief Justice Roberts pointed to two of James 
Madison’s statements: first as Secretary of State, that “the 
selection of church ‘functionaries’ was an entirely ecclesiastical 
matter left to the Church’s own judgment;”57 and again, when 
Madison became President, he vetoed a bill incorporating the 
Episcopal Church in the town of Alexandria, declaring that the 
“the bill . . . comprehending even the election and removal of the 
Minister of the same . . .” violates the First Amendment, as 
evidence of this understanding.58 
Critics attacked the decision for giving undue deference to 
churches at the expense of individual rights,59 thus flipping the Bill 
of Rights on its head. The Court’s account of First Amendment 
history has been described as a “curious mash-up of religious and 
political history that stops in 1791.”60 One commentator claimed 
that Hosanna-Tabor demonstrates the danger of historical 
analogy and originalism in resolving contemporary problems,61 
even while acknowledging that alternative histories also exist that 
support the other side. But is it true? Did the Court really just use 
“English history to overcome civil rights legislation approved by 
Congress?”62 To be sure, not every invocation of James Madison, 
though widely recognized as the father of the Religion Clauses 
(and not Thomas Jefferson) should be treated as holy gospel for 
 56. Id. at 703. 
 57. Id. 
 58. Id. at 704.  
 59. See, e.g., Leslie C. Griffin, The Sins of Hosanna-Tabor, 88 IND. L. J. 981 (2013); 
“The Ministerial Exception,” N.Y. TIMES, Jan, 12, 2012, at A22.  
 60. Winnifred Fallers Sullivan, The Church, THE IMMANENT FRAME, (Jan. 31, 2012, 
4:25 PM), http://blogs.ssrc.org/tif/2012/01/31/the-church/.  
 61. Griffin, supra note 59, at 990 (“Many of the ministerial exception cases have 
involved women clergy in Christian denominations for whom women’s ordination was not 
even imaginable at the time of the nation’s founding.”). 
 62. The decision also cites the freedom of the English church in King John’s 1215 
Magna Carta. Id.   
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the purpose of constitutional interpretation.63 And one can find 
opposing strands of thought existing during the same historical 
moment. But as the Court stated, the text of the First 
Amendment, that is both the Establishment Clause and the Free 
Exercise Clause, does give special solicitude to the rights of 
religious organizations.64 Requiring a church to accept or retain 
an unwanted minister is not just a mere employment matter, but 
an infringement on the freedom of the religious group’s right to 
determine its own faith and mission. 
It is against such a postmodern backdrop that today we face 
questions such as “is religion special?,” a question that would 
certainly acquire increasing constitutional and sociological 
salience in American society in the years to come. Such a question 
betrays a willingness to discard the distinctive place of religion in 
the American constitutional scheme, one that is based largely in 
history. But the Founding generation did think religion was 
special, or at least special enough to merit a separate guarantee in 
the Bill of Rights. In fact, for the most part of American history, 
religion was, and still is, special, at least for an admittedly 
shrinking section of the populace.65 In other words, religion’s 
uniqueness as a subject of constitutional protection is not just for 
epistemic reasons. If religion was simply like any other secular 
affect, it could be protected under the umbrellas of freedom of 
speech, freedom of association or even equal protection, but 
something important is truly lost—for one, an authentic 
expression of people’s beliefs—if public debates are narrowly 
framed in those terms,66 in which case, one is brought back full 
circle to the never-ending search for a neutral baseline. 
This is also the question that Rise and Decline tries to get its 
reader to confront, but it does so by posing a self-subverting 
paradox: if religious freedom has historically theological origins—
specifically the notions of dual jurisdictions and liberty of 
conscience—and we have, by our adherence to modern-day 
 63. See, e.g., Larry D. Kramer, Madison’s Audience, 112 HARV. L. REV. 611 (1999) 
(arguing that contemporary perceptions of the influence of Madison’s ideas at the time of 
the Founding, specifically Federalist No. 10, is probably exaggerated). 
 64. Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch. v. EEOC, 132 S. Ct. 694 at 
706 (2012). But see Schragger & Schwartzman, supra note 21, at 976 (misreading the 
decision to say that it has nothing to do with the rights of churches qua churches).  
 65. Pew Research Religion & Public Life Project, Nones on the Rise (Oct. 9, 2012), 
http://www.pewforum.org/2012/10/09/nones-on-the-rise/ (showing the increasing number 
of Americans who do not identify with any religion).  
 66. For a great and thoughtful exposition of this point, see JEFFREY STOUT, 
DEMOCRACY AND TRADITION (2005).  
 
ANNA SU SMITH RELIGIOUS FREEDOM_DRAFT 1 (DO NOT DELETE) 12/29/2014 3:10 PM 
146 CONSTITUTIONAL COMMENTARY [Vol. 30:127 
principles of secularism and neutrality, disabled the state on 
acting on religious or theological rationales (p. 143), then religious 
freedom is a house that stands on shaky ground. But that, it seems, 
is the wrong proposition to make. Secular rationales also exist in 
support of religious freedom, though contested; in the American 
context, why should we need more than what the Constitution 
explicitly protects and why should its original intent still matter? 
What Smith essentially wants to get his readers to look at is how 
courts have all but forgotten the historical and particularly 
religious legacy of this important freedom, and to make matters 
worse, have upheld and continue to uphold a secular neutrality 
rationale that has largely no basis in history and does not even 
make sense as a philosophical matter. Faced with the “challenge 
of modern equality” (p. 147), the unfortunate endgame of this 
charging train seems predictable. 
As a response to Smith’s concerns in particular and a way to 
keep the American pluralist experiment alive in general, this 
essay suggests a consideration of history and judicial review as 
mutually reinforcing technologies of constraint. The history of the 
Religion Clauses still matters, not because it offers any solution or 
prescribes the right answer, but because it offers everyone, from 
the individual citizen to Supreme Court Justices, a kind of 
constraint. Note that this statement is not the same as “history 
says this, and therefore the result ought to be this . . .” as critics of 
this inclination are wont to point out.67 The aim is not to do 
normative history. While it might be the case that nothing 
prevents actors from creating their own versions of history meant 
to reinforce or support a preexisting contemporary agenda, that 
view erroneously presupposes that the present can be completely 
severed from the past. That is simple human conceit. However we 
view that past, it is an inescapable inheritance that provides fixed 
points of reference for our present-day conversations, the 
constitutional ones most especially. American constitutional 
identity might be evolving, but it is still rooted in history. Thus, 
the results can never veer far off. At the very least, the history 
behind the Religion Clauses is evidence of an intent, acquiesced 
to and repeatedly affirmed across time,68 that the protection of 
religious liberty is special and merits a distinctive guarantee in the 
 67. See, e.g., Erwin Chemerinsky, History, Tradition, the Supreme Court and the First 
Amendment, 44 HASTINGS L.J. 901, 909 (1993) (criticizing the use of history to justify 
conservative results). 
 68. STEPHEN HOLMES, PASSIONS AND CONSTRAINT: ON THE THEORY OF LIBERAL 
DEMOCRACY 134–76 (1995).   
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American constitutional tradition. It is history immediate enough 
and with sufficient resources for both sides of the debate. 
At the same time, judicial review, especially that of the 
Supreme Court, is still the best institutional vehicle to realize 
these quite abstract ideals of disestablishment and free exercise in 
practice. While it does amplify the stakes of a debate, as Smith 
rightfully points out, litigation also addresses gaps that popular 
mobilizations cannot. Courts provide a venue for unpopular 
minority opinions, whether a minority vis-à-vis the rest of the 
country or a minority vis-à-vis the rest of the state or some other 
local subdivision.69 For instance, it would have been rather hard, 
if not impossible, for adherents of the religious group Jehovah’s 
Witnesses in the early 20th century to get popular support for 
their refusal to salute the American flag. Notwithstanding claims 
that courts, even the Supreme Court, are quite limited in terms of 
inducing broad-sweeping social changes,70 judicial review first and 
foremost affords a forum for the redress of individual grievances.71 
Under this view, structural or systemic reverberations which are 
often at the heart of public interest or cause lawyering take a 
secondary role. But in the process, judicial interpretation of the 
Religion Clauses also delineates the range of possible meanings 
and available constitutional vocabulary with which the public and 
other branches of government could engage then and in the 
future. Not all constraints are limitations but instead function as 
an invitation to construct a richer nomos.72 As the history of 
litigation involving religion in the past half a century since 
Everson would show,73 the Supreme Court is hardly the final word 
on the matter. The value of judicial review in a world where 
separate communities with their respective normative universes, 
are nonetheless required to coexist in one society under one 
Constitution, is that it can ensure cooler heads prevail,74 and thus, 
keep the conversation going for the foreseeable future. 
 69. JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL 
REVIEW (1980).  
 70. GERALD N. ROSENBERG, THE HOLLOW HOPE: CAN COURTS BRING ABOUT 
SOCIAL CHANGE? (1991). 
 71. The subject is too complex to be addressed sufficiently in a review essay. For this 
claim in all its nuance, see Alon Harel & Adam Shinar, Between Judicial and Legislative 
Supremacy: A Cautious Defense of Constrained Judicial Review, 10 INT’L. J. CONST. L. 950 
(2012) (a justification of judicial review is that it affords a right to a hearing). 
 72. Robert M. Cover, The Supreme Court, 1982 Term – Foreword: Nomos and 
Narrative, 97 HARV. L. REV. 4 (1983). 
 73. Gordon, supra note 49. 
 74. See PAUL HORWITZ, THE AGNOSTIC AGE: LAW, RELIGION AND THE 
CONSTITUTION (2013).  
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CONCLUSION 
Rise and Decline looks at the future of American religious 
freedom with much trepidation. As a result, it reaches beyond the 
Founding period and far back into deep Western history in search 
of solid ground, and takes a dim view of the secularist slippery 
slope that the Supreme Court has taken contemporary Religion 
Clause jurisprudence. This essay has argued that both the 
nostalgia for the deep past and its disdain for the Supreme Court 
are misplaced. But that does not mean this thought-provoking 
book does not raise fundamental questions, or that its diagnosis 
of the problem is wrong. Smith claims that there is something 
fundamental that would be lost if we abandon the logic of 
jurisdiction that animated the historic commitment to freedom of 
church and conscience. He is right. As Mark DeWolfe Howe 
wrote, “[G]overnment must recognize that it is not the sole 
possessor of sovereignty.”75 It is this concern which is at the heart 
of the book. The allure of equality, without the depth and 
robustness a substantive heritage such as religion could imbue it, 
might be nothing more than cupping sand. We could celebrate it 
in the short term, but if we do, in the long run, we will end up all 
the more impoverished for it. 
 
 75. Mark DeWolfe Howe, The Supreme Court, 1952 Term – Foreword: Political 
Theory and the Nature of Liberty, 67 HARV. L. REV. 91 (1953) (on the political theory of 
pluralism).  
 
